COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE AND
COURT CONGESTION IN MASSACHUSETTS
DUNBAR F. CARPENTER*

There took effect in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on January 1, I927,
"An Act requiring owners of certain motor vehicles and trailers to furnish security
for their civil liability on account of personal injuries caused by their motor vehicles
and trailers."' This act, commonly known and hereinafter referred to as "the compulsory motor vehicle insurance act," provides that no motor vehicle or trailer
privately owned shall be registered in the Commonwealth unless the application for
registration is accompanied by a certificate from an insurance company authorized to
transact casualty business in the Commonwealth stating that it has issued to the
applicant a policy to the amount of at least $5,ooo on account of injury to or death
of any one person, and of at least $io,ooo on account of any one accident resulting in
injury to or death of more than one person, arising out of the unlawful or negligent
operation of a motor car upon the ways of the Commonwealth. 2 The insurance
policy actually covers the particular car insured, as it covers not merely the owner
but also "any person responsible for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle with
his express or implied consent.

. ..,

Broadly speaking, therefore, any person injured, and the estate of any person
killed, upon the public ways of the Commonwealth by the unlawful or negligent
operation of a privately owned Massachusetts car are assured of the payment of any
judgment that may be recovered up to $5,0o0.4 If a judgment exceeds the $5,ooo or
*A.B., igoo, LL.B., 1903, Harvard University. Member of Massachusetts Bar, practising in Boston.
Editor of Bar Bulletin published by the Bar Association of the City of Boston.
'Mass. Acts 1925, C. 346, MAss. GEN. LAws (Tercent. ed. 1932) c. 90, especially §§SA, 3 4 A-34J.
' There are alternative provisions, allowing an applicant for registration to give a surety bond or to
deposit with a state department $5,ooo in cash, bonds or stock, in lieu of insurance, but these alternatives
are seldom, if ever, used.
Motor vehicles owned by the Commonwealth or any political division are excepted, id. c. go, §SA, as
are also those owned by common carriers of passengers (railroads and street railways). The latter, however, are required to deposit with the state treasurer a surety bond to cover payment of final judgments
for injury to person or property, or for death, arising out of any negligent or unlawful act in the use or
operation of their motor vehicles. Id. c. i59A, §6. Hence for all practical purposes railroads and street
railways operating motor vehicles may be considered as "insured."
"Id. c. 90, §3 4A. In order to recover on the insurance policy, the action must be brought against the
insured, whether or not he was operating the car at the timef of the accident, within one year after the
accident.
'The exceptions are (i) where the car is being operated without the consent of the owner, e.g.,
stolen; (2) where the insurance policy has been cancelled, e.g., for non-payment of the premium, and the
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Sio,ooo limit, the plaintiff can recover the excess from the insurer up to the amount
of insurance above the statutory minimum which the insured may be carrying,5 or
from the defendant, provided the latter has property which can be reached on
execution.
The act prescribes that the premiums for coverage shall be fixed by the State
Commissioner of Insurance. For this purpose the insurers conduct a bureau under
the supervision of the State Insurance Department which collects, classifies, tabulates
and analyzes the combined experience data of the insurers, submitting annually these
data with recommendations for rates for the ensuing year to the Insurance Commissioner who has the sole duty of fixing fair and reasonable classifications of risks
and adequate, just and non-discriminatory premiums.
It has seemed necessary to give in broad outlines a summary description of the
compulsory motor vehicle insurance act 6 before proceeding to discuss the narrow
issues to which this article is confined, to wit: the effect of the act upon the courts,
and the measures taken to increase the capacity of the judicial system.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MASSAcHusETTs JuDiciAL SYsTEm

The Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth. The Supreme Judicial
Court, consisting of a chief justice and six associate justices, is the appellate court,
and as it manages to keep pretty well abreast of its work, although always under
substantial pressure, it need not further concern us.
The Superior Court. The Superior Court, consisting of a chief justice and thirtyone associate justices, covers the state, holding sittings in every county, at times
fixed by the chief justice, to which sittings the associate justices are assigned by the
chief justice. The Superior Court tries all jury cases, both civil and criminal, and has
general jurisdiction in equity.
The District Courts. There are seventy-two district courts scattered throughout
the Commonwealth, exclusive of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston. The
latter, although properly a part of the district court system, and hereinafter included
when reference is made-to district courts unless otherwise indicated, is in fact an
integrated court with a chief justice and eight associate justices. The other district
courts are separate and distinct from each other. Each of these courts has a presiding
justice who is paid a fixed salary dependent upon the population in his district, and
one or more special justices who serve only when called upon by the presiding justice
or in case of his disability. There are no juries in district courts.
registration plates have not been surrendered to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as required by statute;
and (3) where an insurer has become insolvent.
'It is common for owners who are financially responsible to insure for $Soooo/$2o,ooo, and even
greater amounts.
6While it is not in any sense the purpose of this article either to oppose or defend the Massachusetts
act, it is pertinent to the purposes for which it is written to remark that, although bills for the repeal of
the act are submitted annually to the legislature, the compulsory insuring, of motor cars appears to have
become the settled policy of the Commonwealth.
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The district courts were originally police courts with extremely limited civil and
criminal jurisdiction. Though their criminal jurisdiction is still somewhat limited,
they now have unlimited civil jurisdiction of law cases, but none in equity. For a
number of years prior to 1929, the civil jurisdiction of these courts was limited to
cases involving less than $3,ooo (that of the Boston municipal court to $5,ooo), but
in 1929 the legislature removed the jurisdictional limits of all the district courts by
giving them and the Boston municipal court original jurisdiction concurrent with
the superior court of all actions of contract, tort and replevin, and of actions in
summary process, regardless of the'amount involved.
For present purposes, 7 we have two systems of courts, both having concurrent
original jurisdiction of law actions. The superior court, with thirty-two judges,
sitting throughout the state, is the sole jury court. The other court consists of
seventy-two independent district court judges, nine Boston municipal court judges
and more than one hundred and fifty special judges, each district court having one
or more such special judges, and the Boston municipal court, six.
It is well to keep in mind the disparity in man-power, or better perhaps judgepower, between the two courts-the superior court with its thirty-two justices, and
the district courts with somewhat more than two hundred and thirty justices-for
presumably two hundred and thirty judges, sitting without juries, can try very
many more cases than thirty-two judges, especially when the latter sit frequently
with juries. An offset to the foregoing presumption is that, owing to historical
reasons, many of the district courts are in small towns and handle few, if any, civil
cases.
EFFECT OF COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ON LITIGATION
CIVIL CAsEs ENTERED IN SUPERIOR CoURT

Year Ending

Law

New Cases Entered
Equity

June 30, 1910 ........................................

Io,868

June 30, 1920 ..........
..............................
June 30, 1925 ..............
...............................
June 30, 1926 ........................................
June 30, 1927 ........................................
June 30, 1928 ........................................
June 30, 1929
...........................................
June 30, 1930
.........................................
June 30, 1931 ........................................

1,599

15,638

2,208

23,090

3,009
3,3z6

June

30, 1932 ........................................
June 30, 1933 ........................................
June 30, 1934 ........................................
June 30, 1935 ........................................

23,223

24,513

3,655

32,633
33,335
35,190

28,587

3,392
3,502
3,642
3,604
3,411
3,536

25,446

3,251

22,075

2,881

36,9o

34,464

It will be observed from the foregoing table that from i9io up to June 30, 1927

the increase in law entries, although more than doubling, conformed fairly closely
to the increase in equity entries. The compulsory motor vehicle insurance act took
'Other courts such as the land courts and the probate courts have no relation to this subject.
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effect on January i, 1927. Its results clearly appear in the number of entries for the
court year beginning July I, i927 and ending June 3o , 1928, which show an increase
of over 9,ooo entries above those for the year ending June 30, 1926, the last full court
year prior to the effective date of the act. While it cannot be positively asserted that
the increase in entries was composed solely of motor tort cases, there being no
separate statistics on that point, nevertheless, it seems obvious that such was the
fact. The Massachusetts Judicial Council stated in its 1929 report8 that for the five
months' period from October I, 1927 to March I, 1928 there were 4,2oi more law
cases entered in the superior court than in the same period October 1926 to March
x927, and that of this increase 97.4 per cent were motor vehicle cases.
It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the sharp decline in law entries beginning after June 30, i93i, the entries for the year ending June 30, 1935 being 14,000
less than for the peak year, 1931, and approximately on a level with the entries for
1925. A possible explanation therefor is the depression, although while law entries
decreased 39 per cent from 1931 to 1935 equity entries decreased only 20 per cent.
Another possible contributing cause may lie in the investigation directed by the
Supreme Judicial Court into unprofessional practices by lawyers in accident cases
which may have discouraged the bringing of some "nuisance" cases.
The ability of a court to clear its docket depends, in large degree, upon its trial
capacity. The number of justices of the superior court has remained constant since
1925. The court tries approximately 3,200 civil law cases a year, of which, roughly,
2,50o are jury cases and 700 are jury waived. The trial of civil law cases is only one
phase of its work. It necessarily devotes much time to its equity and criminal
calendars.
MEASURES

ADOPTED TO

RELIEVE CONGESTION IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

The effect of the greatly increased number of law entries occurring after 1927
upon the docket of the superior court has, of course, lengthened the time between
entry and trial of jury cases. While in some of the sittings a jury case may be reached
eighteen months after filing, in the larger sittings, and especially in Suffolk County
in which the city of Boston is located and which receives nearly one half of the
entries of civil cases in the Commonwealth, it takes between three and four years to
have jury trial.
The delay in reaching trial has naturally caused much public discussion, and
various efforts have been made to better the situation. Bills to require the payment
of a jury fee as small as ten dollars have failed of enactment. Several steps recently
taken, one by the legislature and the others by the superior court, seem to be helpful.
I. Act Requiring All Motor Tort Cases to be Entered in District Courts

In 1934, the legislature passed an act 9 giving district courts exclusive original
jurisdiction of actions of tort arising out of the operation of motor vehicles. The
8
aMASS. JUD. COUNCIL, FIFTH REPORT, 1929, p. 7.
'Mass. Acts 1934,

C.

387, commonly known as the Fielding Act.
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Constitution of Massachusetts gives parties a right to trial by jury. The voluntary
entry of a case in a district court is an election to waive trial by jury. This act would
undoubtedly be unconstitutional if it sought to compel a plaintiff to abandon his
right to trial by jury. It therefore provides that after a plaintiff has entered his
motor tort case in a district court he may, not less than two days nor more than four
days after such entry, remove to the superior court. The defendant necessarily has
always had the right to remove any case entered in a district court if he acts
promptly. The effect of the act therefore is simply to require a motor tort case to
be entered in a district court, leaving either party to the case full liberty to remove
to the superior court.
MOTOR TORT ENTRIES AND REMOVALS IN DISTRICT COURTS AND BOSTON MUNICIPAL COURT

October 1, 1934 to October i, 1935
Motor Tort
Entries

District Courts ....................

Removals
By Defendant
By Plaintiff

Total

7,761*

27,800

3,432

4,277

7,303

1,582

396

r,978

6,382

x,378

345

1,723

41,485

6,392

5,018

11,462

Boston Municipal Court,
Oct.

i-July

I .......... : .......

Boston Municipal Court,
July i-Oct.

i (Estimated) .......

Total ......................
* 52 cases were removed by both parties.

It will be observed that 30,023 of the 41,485 motor tort cases entered remained in
the district courts and the Boston municipal court, and that II,462 cases, constituting
27 per cent of the motor tort entries, were removed to the superior court. While the
percentage of removals was practically the same for the district courts and the Boston
municipal court, defendants removed 845 more cases from the district courts than
did plaintiffs, whereas defendants were responsible for only 741 out of the 3,701
removals from the Boston municipal court.
That the act under discussion has resulted in relieving the superior court to some
extent seems a reasonable guess, but as no statistics are available showing how many
motor tort cases were entered in the superior court in any year prior to October i,
1934, the date the act took effect, one can not be positive.
2. References to Auditors
Under the statutes of Massachusetts,"0 the superior court may appoint one or
more auditors to hear the parties and report to the court, the auditor's findings of
fact being "prima facie evidence upon such matters only as are embraced in the
order." After an auditor has made his report, either party may have a court trial,
either with or without a jury, as one or the other may elect. At such trial, the
auditor's report is read, but the parties may, after such reading, try the case de novo.
In 1935, the justices of the superior court put into effect a plan for reference of
motor tort cases to auditors. The plan provided that the several county bar asso"MAss. GEN. LAws (Tercent. ed. 1932) c. 221, §56.
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ciations should submit a list of auditors from which the justice assigned to each
county should select, subject to the right of the justice to add additional names. An
important feature in the plan is the requirement that appointments as auditor shall
be confined to lawyers who do not have motor tort cases and who will agree to
refrain from taking such cases during their period of service as auditors.
During the period January 7, 1935 to January 4, 1936, 3,807 motions for references
to auditors were allowed; 42o cases were settled before the reference to the auditor
was actually made; 501 were settled after the rule issued, before report; and io89
were settled after report. 2,134 cases were finally disposed of after the motion for
reference was allowed at a cost averaging only $32 a case.10* Auditors are paid $5 an
hour for the actual time spent in hearings and in preparing their reports.ob A less
favorable feature is the insistence by one party or the other on jury trial in i,2o7 of
the cases reported by auditors. There are indications, happily, that references of
motor tort cases are meeting with growing favor bn the part of the bar. It should,
perhaps, be remarked that there was a feeling somewhat prevalent that the insurers,
who are the real defendants as they pay the bill, would generally remove cases from
the district courts and demand jury trial in the auditor cases. The statistics, however, clearly indicate that plaintiffs remove more cases than do the defendants, and
demand jury trials after report by the auditor more frequently than do the defetidants.
A member of the Massachusetts bar has kindly given the writer the following
interesting account illustrating the benefits which may be derived from trial by
auditor:
"' A more detailed analysis of cases referred to auditors for one county (Essex) from January xx,
1935 through June 30, 1936, as follows:
Motions for reference allowed .....................................................
1,245
No. cases settled before reference ...............................................
264
No. cases referred ...........................................................
699
No. cases not referred but pending .............................................
282
Disposition of cases referred
Settled during trial ..........................................................
96
Settled after trial ............................................................
158
Disposed of on motion for judgment ...........................................
25
Disposed of by discontinuance .................................................
4
Disposed of by party's default* ................................................
165
Disposed of by trial by court ..................................................
5
Disposed of by judgment on verdict ............................................
12
Pending after hearing ........................................................
234
Total ...................................................................

699

*It is provided by statute that if either party neglects to appear at the hearing, without just cause, or
refuses to produce the testimony relied on by him, the auditor may close the hearing and recommend that
judgment be entered for the adverse party. Judgment shall be entered accordingly at the first judgment
day after ten days from the filing of the report, unless the court, for cause shown, otherwise orders. MAss.
GnN. LAws, C. 221, 558.
Court trials have been demanded in 164 cases after the filing of the auditor's report, in 41 cases by
plaintiffs, in 4o , by defendants, and in 83, by both parties. The foregoing table indicates that 729 cases
have been actually finished on the docket, 264 having been settled before reference, 465 disposed of after
reference. Auditor's fees totalled $xo,412.13.
'a5 The reference is always to a single auditor.
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As the result of a collision between a taxi-cab and a sedan one person was killed,
three were seriously injured and several others suffered minor injuries. Nineteen
law suits resulted in four different counties. The nineteen cases were consolidated
and tried together before one auditor. Hearings ran for eight trial days, and before
completion of the liability evidence all the cases were adjusted. If the cases had
been tried before a jury they would in all probability have taken thirty trial days.
One of the great advantages of trial before the auditor was that, whenever two
of the eleven attorneys engaged in the hearing came close to settling a case, the
auditor was free to suspend the hearings for a few minutes or for a longer time
while counsel conferred with clients. Thus the cases were settled one by one until
all nineteen suits were disposed of. The county was spared the expense of even
having the auditor file a detailed report. The auditor's bill to Suffolk County was
$179.25 and the entire cost to all four counties was $227.50. The cost to the taxpayers

of Massachusetts, if there had been jury trials of all the cases arising out of this one
accident, might easily have reached from $io,ooo to $15,ooo.
3. Pre-trialProcedurein Suffolk County
The superior court also adopted in 1935 a pre-trial procedure in Suffolk County
based on the Detroit practice. Shortly before a case is to be reached for trial,
counsel are notified to appear before the justice having charge of the pre-trial list,
for a conference. Clients may appear and take part in the discussion, and frequently
do. Plaintiff's counsel briefly states the essential facts on which he relies. Defendant's
counsel does likewise. The court then discusses the possibility of a settlement. If
efforts for settlement fail the justice endeavors in many cases to obtain waiver of jury
trial, and ascertains whether the pleadings are in proper order. Requests for amendments must be presented at the pre-trial hearing. The justice also discusses with
counsel the possibility of agreeing upon facts upon which there is no real dispute, to
the end that the trial may be shortened and the parties saved the expense of unnecessary witnesses. Frequently the exact issues of fact to be tried are agreed upon.
A blank form is filled out and signed by the justice. This form contains the name
of the case, the names of the trial lawyers, the disposition of any request as to
pleadings, the justice's opinion as to the chances of settlement, a statement of every
fact agreed upon, and, frequently, a concise statement of the agreed issues to be
tried.
The only other matter taken up at the pre-trial hearing is the date for the trial.
The parties have been notified that they must find out in advance of the pre-trial
call whether their witnesses are available. In order to save parties the expense of
re-investigating their witnesses, the pre-trial call is held, ordinarily, not more than
two weeks before the case is likely to be reached for trial. All requests for delay
for causes then existing must be made at the pre-trial call. Once a case passes to the
short list, continuances are granted rarely and only for causes arising after the pretrial call not due to the fault of the party desiring the continuance.
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The short list for trial is composed exclusively of cases already considered at the
pre-trial call. Counsel receive two telephone notices from the list clerk--one the day
before the case is actually held for trial, the other on the day the case is reached, a
fifteen minute notice to appear in a particular session."'
The operation of the pre-trial procedure in its first ten months is indicated in
the tables following:
SUMMARY OF WORK IN THE PRE-TRIAL SESSION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, SUFFOLK COUNTY
SEPTEMBER,

1935,

TO

JULY I, 1936

Total number cases appearing in pre-trial lists ............................
Pre-trial disposition of cases not marked for trial
C ases settled ....................................................
Re-trial non-suits ................................................
Pre-trial defaults .................................................
Pre-trial non-suits and defaults .....................................
Pre-trial continuances ............................................

4,637
2,o66
228
197
157

427
3,075

Cases pre-tried and marked for trial ....................................
To jury sessions ......................................................
To jury waived sessions ...............................................

1,562
1,380
182

When the superior court adjourned on June 30, 1936 it had reached for trial a
case (No. 28447 I ) in which the writ was dated November 7, 1932, whereas in the

previous year the writ for the highest case reached (No. 266o2i) was dated July 6,
1931. The significance of the gain of four months thus made can be better understood if it is realized that for many years the nearest date of writ actually reached for
trial at the end of the court year had been progressively receding.
4. Other Measures
Reference should be made to three other steps taken in 1935 by the superior court.
It put into effect in Suffolk County, where frequently as many as ten civil and criminal jury sessions are being held, a plan for a jury pool. Under this plan a talesman,
instead of reporting to a particular sitting as formerly, reports to a central room
from which he goes when his attendance is required as a juror and to which he
returns when no longer needed in a sitting.
In January, 1935, there were 279 jurors in actual attendance for four criminal and

six civil sessions in Suffolk, and in February, 274. In November, 1935, after jury
" The foregoing account of pre-trial procedure is taken from an informative article, Pre-Trial Procedure
in Suffolk County, by Hon. Wilford D. Gray, the Justice of the Superior Court then in charge of the
pre-trial call, appearing in the Bar Bulletin (Bar Ass'n of the City of Boston) No. 107 (Jan., 1936). "On
many days since the new system went into effect," the learned Justice states in his article, "every case that
has been notified to be ready for trial has actually had the opportunity to be tried on the first day, and
As nearly as we can
it is the rare case that has been obliged to come more often than the second day ....
make a comparison [with previous years] we appear to have disposed of several hundred, and perhaps
as many as four hundred, more cases in the period of the opening of Court in September, 1935, to the
end of the December sitting."
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pooling had gone into effect, there were i9o jurors in attendance, and in December,
193. It is announced that the annual saving in money resulting from jury pooling
exceeds $75,ooo a year.
One serious difficulty confronting parties when a case was finally reached for trial
was that it would frequently be found that counsel for one party or the other was
then engaged in court somewhere else. To obviate this difficulty the superior court
made an order effective September I, x935 throughout the Commonwealth, providing
that "when an engagement of counsel is pleaded as a ground for postponement the
court may postpone the trial of a case for not more than ten days, and upon the
expiration of the postponement period there shall be no further postponement because of any engagement of counsel."
Another experiment tried by the court, with considerable success, is what is
known as the "A" Session. Under this plan a named justice is selected to preside
over a jury-waived session. When a jury case is about to be reached, the parties are
allowed to waive jury trial and have the case tried in the jury-waived session. The
reason for this "A" Session is that lawyers are often willing to waive a jury if
they know what judge will try the case who are not willing to do so without that
CONCLUDING REMARKS
knowledge.
It will be obvious to the reader that not only are the justices of the superior
court fully alive to the situation but also that they have adopted several ingenious
methods for reducing congestion. Except for the statute requiring original entries
of motor tort cases in a district court, all the measures above mentioned were' adopted
by the justices under their inherent rule-making power.
Sufficient time has not elapsed since the statute and rules of court just discussed
became effective to warrant an opinion as to the maximum effect they will have in
reducing congestion in the superior court. 2 Mr. Justice Gray remarks in his article
cited above, Pre-TrialProcedurein Suffolk County, "The average plaintiff's attorney
is still wedded to the beliaf that success in such [personal injury] cases depends
upon the jury trial." No doubt defendants' attorneys also frequently claim jury
trial when the plaintiff does not. That the bar, as a whole, is jury-minded is indicated by the fact that on June 3o, 1935 there were 50,473 cases awaiting jury trial as
against 7,591 awaiting trial without jury. The impossibility of performing the task
thrust upon the justices of the superior court may perhaps be made clear by the
following supposition. If the chief justice and the thirty-one justices of the court
should suspend all other work and devote themselves for the full court year of
approximately 200 trial days to jury cases, and should each try one case a day, they
would thus dispose by jury trial of only 6,400 cases.' 8
'One interesting feature about the various plans herein mentioned is that they do not work uniformly
well throughout the Commonwealth. In some counties the bar seems to prefer trial by auditors, whereas
in other counties the "A" session has the preference. Removals of motor tort cases also vary greatly,
running from 15 per cent of the entries in some of the district courts to as high as 50 per cent in others.
'As a matter of fact, one trial may dispose of several cases. All cases arising out of the same accident
are tried together, including cross actions. Thus there may be two or more cases by persons injured, in
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The usual remedy suggested for relieving congestion is to increase the number
of justices, and have more jury trials, but this method has never produced the result
expected. Without entering upon a full discussion of the pros and cons, it is perhaps
sufficient to say that there comes a time when the taxpayer rebels against increasing
taxes. The only payment made by a plaintiff to the Commonwealth for a jury
trial, which is estimated to cost the Commonwealth about $400 a day, is his threedollar entry fee. The defendant, even though he claims a jury, when the plaintiff
does not, pays exactly nothing. There is a limit to free service, and thus far the
legislature, although strongly pressed, has resisted the temptation to increase the
superior court bench. The Judicial Council stated in its annual report for 1933, "In
our opinion, the proposal to increase the number of judges [of the superior court]
would be an expensive method of getting us nowhere, even if we had the courthouse
space in which to use them."
It should be emphasized that the compulsory motor vehicle insurance act is not
the sole cause of congestion. Even before it became effective in 1927, the docket of
the superior court was congested, The number of civil cases entered in the superior
court for the year ending June 30, x91o was io,868; for the year ending June 30, 1920,
15,638; and for the year ending June 30, 1926, the year immediately prior to the
effective date of the compulsory insurance act, .23,223. It seems plain, therefore,
that the compulsory insurance act merely accelerated the natural growth of entries,
which the rapidly increasing number of motor cars after i92o made inevitable.
It has been shown by experience extending over many years that the civil trial
capacity of the superior court is approximately 3,200 jury and jury-waived cases a
year; the number of entries per court year for the past ten years has always exceeded
22,ooo cases, and has reached as high as 36,i9 o . Thus it would be natural to conclude
that if 36,000 cases are entered in any one year and 3,200 are tried in a year the court
would have to devote more than ten years to the trial of one year's 36,000 entries.
Such is not the case. While the number of jury and jury-waived cases tried in the
year ending June 30, 1935 was 3,177 the number of law cases finally disposed of was
25,458; that is, for every case tried approximately seven disappeared from the docket
without trial. The returns made by the clerks of court under the heading "Number
finally disposed of" give no data as to the method of disposition. Doubtless a great
many eases are settied, some to the complete satisfaction of the parties, and others
because the plaintiffs, especially in accident cases, are unwilling or financially unable
to wait three or four years for jury trial. Included in the cases finally disposed of
are a certain number which are dismissed by rule of court because they have been
marked inactive. In June of each year every case which has remained upon the
docket for three years, without action, is marked inactive and at the end of the
third year from the year in which it is marked inactive is automatically dismissed.
car No. x, brought against both the owner, and the operator, if other than the owner, of car No. 2, and
the occupants of car No. 2 may, and usually do, bring actions against the owner and the operator of
car No. x.
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Experience indicates that only about 20 per cent of the cases marked inactive are
ever restored to the trial docket. During the court year ending June 30, 1935, 5,310
law cases were marked inactive-which is approximately the number marked inactive each year. Of those cases, 4,240 or 8o per cent of the total will presumably be
dismissed in June, 1938. Those 4,240 cases represent a substantial financial outlay by
either the plaintiffs or their lawyers-amounting at a guess to six dollars a case-or
roughly $25,000.
We seem to have evolved a system in this Commonwealth, which is doubtless
substantially the same in all the more populous states, whereby actual trial of cases
is relatively unimportant in its bearing upon congestion, since the parties either
manage to compose their differences by settlement, or, in the case of plaintiffs,
abandon their cases altogether, in seven cases out of every eight entered. Whether
one likes it or not, the fact seems to be that the cost of jury trial, including overhead,
estimated by the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 14 at between $400 and $5oo a day,
makes it unlikely that the number of jury sittings will be substantially, if at all,
increased in the immediate future.Y5
The several steps already taken in order to relieve congestion in the superior
court are too recent to make it possible to draw sound conclusions as to their ultimate
effect. If, however, the parties to motor tort litigation-in reality, that part of the
bar which tries accident cases-should increasingly accept trial in district courts, or
abide by the findings of the auditors in removed cases, it seems probable that the
present congestion in the superior court will melt av;ay. If, however, jury trials
continue in large demand, the possibility always exists that motor tort cases will be
bodily taken out of the courts and handed over to a commission. A proposal to that
effect was considered and reported adversely by the Special Commission to Study
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance and Related Matters, appointed under
a resolve of the legislature.'8
It is not the intention of the writer, however, to convey the impression that the
present situation, however uncomfortable, is beyond hope. The discerning editor of
the Journalof the American JudicatureSociety says of Massachusetts, "Here is a state
in which so much investigation and planning is being done that it is hardly possible
for a foreigner to keep abreast of affairs.''17 An unforeseen result of the compulsory
motor car insurance acthas been to focus public attention upon the courts, and, as
clearly appears from the various measures above mentioned recently adopted by the
superior court, to create in the judges a deeper sense of their own responsibility for

the administration of justice.
'MASS.

JUD. COUNCIL SEVENTH REPORT,

1931, p. x3.

'Nothing said in this article is to be construed as a disparagement of the jury as an institution. The
sole purpose of the writer is to set forth statistically as far as possible, and entirely dispassionately in any
event, the cold facts with respect to the possibility of obtaining jury trial in Massachusetts.
"eSen. Rep. 280 (1930), reprinted in (1930)
' (Aug. 5936) 20 J.AM. Jun. SOc. 47.
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